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INTERNATIONAL TRADE, FACTOR MARKET
DISTORTIONS AND THE OPTIMAL DYNAMIC SUBSIDY
by Harvey E. Lapan*
International trade theorists have long favored free trade, arguing that
the only proper basis for a tariff is in response to some monopoly power in
international trade, pragmatic politicians, on the other hand, wary of the
wrath of their constituents, have often resorted to the use of tariffs, arguing
that the protection afforded by tariffs was necessary to prevent unemployment.
Recent papers on the theory of domestic distortions and optimal policy inter
ventions can be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile these two divergent
views. For example, if factors are immobile and if distortions exist in the
factor markets (due to factor price rigidities), then it is argued that the
optimal policy intervention is not a tariff, which destroys the equality be
tween the MRS and FRT, but rather a wage subsidy. This policy prescription,
which recognizes the pragmatic difficulties politicians must face, offers a
feasible remedy that is proved superior to the use of tariffs.
However, one can argue that the theory of optimal policy interventions
goes a bit too far. While it may well be true that factors are not instanta
neously mobile, they certainly do become mobile through time; capital depreciates,
new workers enter the labor force, and factories can be moved intertemporally.
The policies that eliminate unemployment at the same time destroy the incentives
for resource reallocation (particularly if the institutional constraint stipulates
that factor prices must be the same in all sectors). Thus, while the standard
*
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wage subsidy that would promote full employment may be efficient in the short
run, it may prove inefficient in a dynamic setting.
Nevertheless, this does not imply that the efficient long-run policy
entails no interventions; rather, it is likely that it will call for some
wage subsidy which is smaller than the static optimum subsidy. It is the
purpose of this paper to discuss how this dynamic optimum subsidy is determined
and to specify its implications for the economic system.
I. THE PROBLEM
For our analysis we shall use a standard two sector, one factor trade
model.^ Let the two commodities be Mand C, and let and represent the
labor employed in each sector. Then:
(1) M= F^(NJ; C= F^(N^); F '^ > 0, F." < 0; i - c, m.
Furthermore, choose C as the numeraire and let P represent the relative price
of M,
In addition, assume that the number of potential workers in each sector
(L^) is fixed at any moment, and that the total supply of available workers
is fixed for the period in question;
(2) K. ^ L , i = c, m; L + L - L, fixed.
^ ^ c cn
Institutionally, it is assumed that firms behave competitively in factor
(and product) markets, so that workers are paid their marginal value product
(and there cannot be excess demand for factors in either sector). However,
it is also assumed that, because of distortions in the factor market, the
2wage rate must be the same in each sector. Thus, in the absence of any
^If desired, it can be assumed that other factors are used in each
sector; but that these are fixed for the period under study, Harris and
Todaro [4] use this model.
2
The alternative assumption frequently used in the literature is that
actor prices are downward rigid. Either assumption gives qualitatively
similar results, and our assumption seems more consistent with the long-run
behavior of the economy.
wage subsidiesj we have:
(3) F ' (N ) - PF^* (N ); N = L or N - L
cc mm c c m m
The above three equations constitute a long-run equilibrium if coimnodlty
markets clear and if full employment occurs in each sector.
To simplify the analysis, let us assume that the economy in question is
open and "small," so that it can trade at unchanging terras of trade. Assuming
the economy is in long-run equilibrium it will be producing at some point, such
as B in Figure 1, on the long-run production possibility frontier and will
consume somewhere on the price line tangent to the production possibility
4
frontier at B,
Now suppose that, due to external conditions, the terms of trade shift;
for example, assume the country was exporting C and let its terms of trade
Improve (P falls). If factors are immobile, the short-run production pos
sibility frontier is given by ABD; and if no distortions exist in the factor
markets, the country will continue to produce at B and will benefit from the
improved terms of trade. However, if factors are immobile and if factor
prices must be the same in each sector, an excess supply of labor will develop
in Mand output will occur somewhere along the open segment AB. Thus, it is
conceivable that the improved terms of trade might leave the country worse
off.
As has been clearly demonstrated in the literature [1, 5, and 6], the
optimal policy under these circumstances is a wage subsidy to Mthat restores
production at point B. Thus, if we let P be the old price at which resources
3
This simplifying assumption, which is common in the literature [for
example, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2)] allows us to ignore the utility function
(or demand functions) for commodities. Also, it implies that the optimum
tariff is zero. The analysis would not be substantially altered if we dropped
this assumption, or assumed a closed economy,
4 The long-run production possibility frontier represents the efficient
production locus when labor is assumed perfectly mobile.
were fully employed, and P the new world price (P < P), and if S represents
the optimum wage subsidy to sector M, then:
(4) F '^(L^) = [PF '^a_^)] = °
This subsidy restores full employment and enables the country to benefit
from its improved terms of trade.
However, this equilibrium is still sub-optimum in a long-run context
since the change in the terms of trade moves the long-run optimum production
point from B to E (in Figure 1). The obvious question is what determines
intertemporal factor migration and what is the best policy to be pursued in
a dynamic context. If, for example, factor migration between sectors is
determined by economic factors, such as different wages or unemployment rates
in each sector, then the static optimum subsidy (S ) destroys any economic
incentives for migration since, by assumption, wages are equalized between
sectors while, by choice, unemployment is reduced to zero in each sector,^
*Thus, while S may be efficient in a short-run context, it may not be optimal
when considered in a long-run context,^
Clearly, the government may have other tools at its disposal that will
enable it to maintain full employment in the short-run while encouraging
wage rates are equalized across sectors by assumption; an alternative
assumption frequently employed in the literature is that real wages are in
flexible downward. The implications of this latter assumption depends upon
how real wages are defined. For example, if wages in each sector are
assumed inflexible downward" in terms of purchasing power of C, this
coincides with our model (assuming we start from equilibrium); if they are
unemployment will occur due to a fall in P (though
Finri"! / rxses), but wage differentials can occur between the sectors.ally If real wages are d fined in term of some weight d price index.
difLren^ ( necessary to maintain full employment and wage
ferenciairi^Duld H°™ver, nothing guarantees that the wage dif-
encourag.ng^igr'tion. ^
6
(at exist in factor markets, so that full employment
U olliZTZ r? subsidization, it does not follow that this soluti^
migr«i::'be^:enTe;t:rs!°""" encouraging
Figure 1
migration in the direction of long-run equilibrium. One obvious policy tool,
suggested in Harris and Todaro [4] would be simply to force (or restrict)
migration in a particular direction while maintaining the optimal subsidy
★
(S ) needed to guarantee full emplojnnent of resources if there were factor
market distortions (naturally, S changes through time as labor migrates).
However, this particular policy is most likely to be opposed because it in-
fringes on personal liberty (and it is not likely to be very efficient if
all workers are not identical).
The economic tools the government should use to maintain full employment
and encourage migration depend upon the causes of migration and the institu
tional constraints. If migration rates between sectors depend upon differences
in real incomes between the sectors, the government should attempt to enlarge
these differences, while at the same time pursuing a policy that maintains
full employment in all sectors. For example, if we do not assume that wages
must be equalized across sectors, then the government could apply large wage
subsidies to sector C (where labor is more productive) to encourage migration
toward C, while at the same time use the minimum wage subsidy necessary to
promote full employment in M, Even if wages must be equalized across sectors,
the government could encourage migration to Cby imposing a lump sum tax on
workers in M (or a lump sum transfer to workers in C), while at the same time
subsidizing wages in Min order to promote full employment.
However, the above analysis is subject to criticism on several grounds.
It assumes that somehow labor (effectively) demands a minimum real wage but
apparently cannot effectively demand a minimum real standard of living.
Specifically, the above policy can work because it assumes that a wage subsidy
In the following analysis we assume that labor's marginal value product
IS nigher in C, so that the government wishes to encourage migration toward
Cwhile maintaining full employment in F (by means of an optimum subsidy).
can be applied to sector M to meet minimum wage demands and promote full
employment, while (some of) the income from this wage subsidy can be re
moved by lump sum taxation (to promote real income differences between the
sectors) without altering the wage d^ands of laborers in this sector.
Moreover, it can be argued that the economic efficiency of the wage
subsidy to C (to promote migration) depends crucially upon the assumption
that the return to labor is a pure economic rent. If each individual's
labor supply decision were responsive to the wage rate, then the subsidy
in C would create Inefficiencies by causing a discrepancy between the
marginal value product of labor and that worker's marginal rate of sub
stitution between consumption and leisure. Thus, while the wage subsidy
(to the more efficient sector) attempts to promote migration, and hence
dynamic efficiency, it produces static inefficiency.
Given the preceding discussion, we are skeptical about the ability of
the government to costlessly reallocate resources in the econcKny. Thus,
for the remainder of the paper we explicitly assume this reallocation
cannot be achieved costlessly, and that it is the unemployment rate (in
M) that determines the rate of out-migration. One might rationalize this
assumption by arguing that workers are risk averse and hence are unwilling
to move to an unfamiliar situation (a new Industry) if there is a reasonable
chance of finding a job in their own sector. In addition, if it is assumed
that wages must be the same in all sectors, the assumption that unemployment
rates determine migration is equivalent to the assertion that migration is
Q
determined by the differences in expected wages between the sectors.
In the analysis that follows, no assumption will be made about wage
rigidity in either sector; rather, the key relation will be the effect of
S
For further details on this point, see Harris and Todaro [4j,
8unemploymenc rates on mtgration. Nevertheless, when we determine the
optimal time path of the unemployment rate (that balances the gains from
migration against the costs of unemployment), we can infer the wage subsidy
(or tax) that would be needed to support this unemployment rate, and we
can then compare our results to that obtained for the optimum static subsidy.
II. OPTIMAL LABOR TRANSFER
Suppose the econ<^y is out of long-run equilibrium, in the sense that
labor's marginal value product differs between sectors. In particular, let
us assume that the marginal value product of labor is larger in sector C.^
Furthermore, assume that labor is not instantaneously mobile, but that it
moves through time in response to unemployment. We seek to determine the
optimum time path of unemployment, assuming that the central planner wishes
to maximize the present discounted value of the stream of income over the
interval (0, T).
Let production and factor endowments be as described in equations (1)
and (2):
(1) C= (N^); >0, F^" <0
(2) s L^; L^(t) + - L; L fixed
since we wish to encourage migration towards C. it will always be optimal
9
difference in marginal value products may have arisen because of
10
and "smaU assumption that Che economy is open
equivalent to utuit™ "utility of income is constanran^r"irthe^at^of t^ marginal
th': utte'^ c::: wondtp^ti! irizr^t'eV'
lending pattern'in orLr^robta" rt" optimum borrowing andwould Lt be qLUtaWveirarL^d h consumption stream. Our results
maximized. ^^"^ively altered by assuming utility, instead of income, is
to maintain full employment there. Thus, labor migration towards C can be
postulated as a function of the unemployment rate (u) in M:
(5) u e [0, 1]; 4. (0) - 0; $ ' > 0. « " i 0
From the definitions and the initial conditions:
(6) N = L ; N = L (1-u);
c cm m
(7) F^'(L^(0)) > PF '^ (L^(0))
Given (I), (2), (5), (6) and (7), we seek to maximize:
(8) V [F^(L^) + PF^(N^)]e-"dt
The problem as stated is an optimal control problem in one state variable
(L^(t)) and one control variable (u), It is interesting to note chat this
problem is very similar to the optimal growth problem and that the unem
ployment rate plays the role of "saving," The Hamiltonian is:
(9) H= [F^a^) + PF_^(N^)]e''^ '' + $(u)]
(9), X(t) represents the value, discounted to time 0, of transferring
a worker at time t to sector C. It is convenient to define q(t) so that
q(t) represents the value at time t of such a transfer:
(10) q(t) = x(t)e'"'
12Optimizing the Hamiltonian over u yields:
(11) H = Le"'^ '^ [q4.'(u) - PF ' (N )] S 0; u e [0, 1]
In addition, for an optimum path we derive the canonical equations and the
transversality condition:
To generalize the analysis, we could make net migration between sectors
some function of the unemployment rates in each sector. However, it will
always be optimal to maintain full employment in one sector and thus, given
our assumption that labor is initially more productive in C, equation (5)
•Fnl 1 nuRfollows.
12We assume (0) = thus, it will never be optimal to have the
labor force in Mcompletely unemployed. In addition, we assume a' (0) is
finite; if it is not, some unemployment will always be optimal (if marginal
value products differ) and the static optimum subsidy will never be dynamically
efficient. ^
10
(12) q « [r +4> (a)3q - [F • - P(l-u)F ']
c m
(13) L = L $(u)
c m
(14) q(T) = 0; and L^(0) given
By the assumptions on ando", any path that satisfies (11), (12), (13)
and (14) constitutes an optimum solution to the problem. In discussing this
solution, it is convenient to consider separately the two cases: r = 0 and
r >0.
Case i) : r = 0
13For this case, (12) reduces to:
(12') q - [^u)q]- [F ' - P(l-u)F ']
c m
A stationary solution to this problem is obtained by solving (11),
(12') and (13) for = q = 0:
(15) (L^*, q*) s.t.: F '^(L^*) =PF '^(L_^*); =L- L^* q* =(PF^Vf'(O)]
Note that this stationary solution, which would be optimal for L^(0) =L*,
Implies the equalization of marginal value products across sectors.
Also, it can be shown that the solution to the differential equations
*(for ^ L ) represents a saddle-point, and that the unique path which
* *converges to (L^ > ^ ) represents the turnpike--the optimum solution if T
14is unbounded. In order to otudy the properties of an optimal solution,
it is useful to plot the phase diagrams of the system in (L^, q) space.
First, consider (11); if < 0 for all u, then we should choose u =« 0,
if ^ ~ Oj the integral defined in (8) will not converge as T
However, an equivalent problem would be to minimize the deviation of actual
output from maximum output: (F^(£ ) + PF (L ) - F (L ) - PF (N )], where
~ Since this integral converges^ and since tlie twoproblems give equivalent conditions, we can proceed with the problem as
stated,
14Naturally, if t Is unbounded, the transversality condition given by
(14) must be suitably modified. Also, note that L (0) < L* by assumption,
so we are only interested in the solution for L . I? L„(0) > L *
we should want to allow migration out of C, and^hencl unemployment in'c!
We shall say more on this point in footnote 20.
11
Thus, the border between full employment and unemployment is defined by the
values of (L , q) such that H » 0 at u = 0:
o u
(16) g(q. L^) - [q$'(0) - P^CV] = 0
It is clear this locus is positively sloped and asymptotic to the line « L;
the curve AB in Figure 2 is the graph of g(q, L ) = 0. Moreover, above the
c
• •
locus u > 0 and L > 0, whereas below it u = 0, L = 0. Furthermore, how
c c
u responds to changes in q and can readily be derived from (11) (assuming
an interior solution):
(17) au/Sq = -$'/[q$" + > 0
(18) du/SL^ = -[(l-u)PF^"j/[q^," + < 0
Thus, loci of constant unemployment rates are positively sloped in (L^, q)
space.
Next, consider the locus of points such that q » 0, From (11), u can
be written as an implicit function of (L^, q); therefore:
(19) q = 0 defines h(q, L ) := $q - [F ' - P(l-u)F '] = 0
O C OQ
*
For u = 0, it is clear there is a unique value of (equal to as
determined in (15)) such that q » 0; for u > 0, we calculate, using (17),
(18) and (19):
(20) Sh/dq » [$(u)] - PN F "(3u/3q) > 0
m m
(21) ah/aL^ =-F^" - [P(l-u)^q '^F^"]/[q«' +PL^F^] >0
Thus, the locus q » 0 is negatively sloped above the curve AB, and points
above this locus correspond to q > 0, The curve DE in Figure 2 depicts the
h(q, L^) = 0 locus.
The choice of an optimal solution thus entails choosing the value of
q(0); in turn, this will depend on L (0) and T, the length of the planning
o
horizon. If the horizon is unbounded, the optimal choice is the turnpike
and the corresponding value of q(0). Note that everywhere on the turnpike
solution corresponds to some unemployment, but the economy asymptotically
approaches the allocation where labor's marginal value product is eq\ial
across sectors.
For finite horizons, the initial value of q(0) chosen will lie below
the turnpike; in particular, the shorter the horizon, the smaller the value
of q(0) (and hence the smaller the initial unemployment rate).^^ Further,
for sufficiently small planning horizons, it will not be optimal to incur
any unemployment.^^ To see this, suppose we have followed an optimal path
for the interval (0, T - T), and let L^(T - t) be the corresponaing value
of labor. The cost of incurring any further unemployment over the interval
(dt) is A:
(22) A-- P-L -u.F '(N ) - dt
— m m m
The benefit, in terms of more future output, if resources will be fully
employed over the remaining interval (T - dt) is B:
(23) B~ (F ' - PF '(L )) $ (u) • L • T • dt, where;
m m m
(24) dL = -dL =s $ (u) • L • dt
c m ^ ' m
If (B - A) is nonpositive at u - 0, it will not pay to incur any further
unemployment; thus, if:
(25) TS [PF^'aj]/[0'(O)(F^' - PF '^)],
it is optimum to choose u = 0.
Several conclusions follow from (25). First, it is clear that for
any finite horizon it will not be optimal to transfer labor so that
^c~ ' Moreover, for any finite horizon there should always be a
terminal period with full employment of resources. Further, for small T
or L^(0) near , ic may not pay to incur any unemployment.
ho ^ turnpike correspond to maximization of (8) subjectt a terminal constraint o L (T). v / j
earlii!^^? ^he optimum static subsidy referred toer (if distortLons exist in factor markets).
12
13
Figure 2; r • 0
Figure 3j r > 0
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It is readily seen that the terminal value of L (on the optimal path)
increases with T;'"' thus, from (25), it follows that longer planning periods
correspond to longer periods of unemployment and longer periods of full
employment of resources. In conclusion, the optimal path for any finite
horizon can be characterized as follows:
(26) t e (0, T - T), u > 0, i > 0
c
t e (T - T. T). u = 0;
where t is determined by (25). Also, we may have t = T in some cases,
whereas t always increases with T. We shall see that similar results hold
for the case r > 0.
Case ii); r > 0
The principal difference in this case is that future benefits are
discounted, so that even for an infinite horizon, it will never pay to fully
reallocate labor so that marginal value products are equated across sectors.
The AB locus, as defined by equation (16) is unaltered by the positive dis
count rate; however, the q = 0 locus is altered, as represented by (12).
iff "k
The intersection of these two curves, as shown in Figure 3, is (L , q ):
c
(27) F '(L *) - PF '(L *) = [PF '(L *) ' r]/«'(0) > 0
c c mm mm
q* = [F,'{L *) - PF '(L *)]/r
c c mm
Thus, this solution, which corresponds to a stationary point, does not imply
the equalization of marginal value products.
Though the q « 0 locus is altered by the assumption r > 0, qualitatively
It looks much the same as for r ^ 0, For u > 0, the locus is negatively
sloped and points above it correspond to q > 0; for u = 0, the locus remains
negatively sloped (rather than becoming vertical) and crosses the axis
^^This can be demonstrated by comparing the optimal paths for the
horizons T and (T + dT) respectively.
15
at the labor allocation that equalizes labor's marginal value product in
18 *the two sectors. For L^(0) < , the solution to the differential
ie *equations* (L^ > <1 ) represents a saddle-point, and the unique path which
converges to this point represents the turnpike--the optimum solution if T
is unbounded.
In discussing the optimum solution, it is necessary to consider two
separate cases. If L (0) < L , the solution path is qualitatively the same
V V
as that discussed for the case r = 0. The infinite time horizon solution
corresponds to the turnpike; any finite time horizon corresponds to a choice
19of q(0) that lies below the turnpike. Moreover, the finite time horizon
solution is characterized by an initial period of unemployment and a final
period of full employment of resources (unless T is small, in which case
the initial period is degenerate). Further, as the horizon Increases, both
of these periods increase in length.
However, if L (0) > L (but L (0) < L , where L is the labor alloca-
c c c c c
tion that equalizes marginal value products), the optimal solution is to do
nothing regardless of the length of the planning period.Intuitively,
this occurs because future benefits are discounted. The cost of incurring
positive unemployment during the period (dt) is as described in (22);
however, the benefits that accrue, assuming full employment is to be
18Equation (21) is unaltered by r > 0; in (20), there is an extra term,
equal to r, on the RHS. From (12), q » 0, u = 0, and F '= PF * implies
q = 0. cm
19As for r « 0, the smaller T, the smaller q(0),
20Throughout, we have assumed L (0) < L , so that migration towards Mis
never desirable. However, by permitting positive unemployment in C, the solution
could be rendered symmetric. In this case, the q - 0 curve would be extended
to values of q < 0 (since moving labor to C is undesirable) and there would be
an A'B' locus that defines the region where unemployment in^C is undesirable.
Then,__there would be two^saddle point solutions, one for L < L and one for
^ employment is always optimal? Finally,
for r - 0,
16
maintained over the remaining time (T -dt), must be discounted. Thus,
(23) becomes:
(23') B' = (F^" - PF '^)$(u) • . [(l-e"'''^ )/r] • dt
Therefore, it is not worthwhile to incur any (more) unemployment if:
(25') 2 [F " - PF ' (1 + (r/$' (0)))]/[F ' - PF ' ]; r 0
cm cm
In particular, if the numerator is negative, the optimal solution, regard
less of T, is u = 0 throughout.
Thus, the presence of a positive discount rate increases the likelihood
that it will not pay to incur any unemployment. Consequently, the optimum
static subsidy can be dynamically optimum if the planning period is short,
the discount rate is large, or marginal value products do not differ widely
21across sectors. Given the optimum path, as described above, let us now
attempt to describe how particular economic variables change along this
path,
III. THE ECONCMIC PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL PATH
The previous section has described the qualitative properties of an
optimal solution; in this section we plan to describe some of the quantita
tive properties of this solution. As we have seen, it is possible that the
optimal solution coincides with doing nothing--in this case, the economic
variables remain constant over the planning horizon, and the only appropriate
policy is the one that maintains full employment in each sector. If factor
price rigidities exist, it may be necessary to use wage subsidies to maintain
full ^ployment, and these wage subsidies would correspond to the optimum
static subsidy discussed in the literature.
21
For the infinite horizon case, only the presence of discounting can
make the static solution efficient.
However, suppose the optimum path entails incurring some unemployment
during the initial period. What, then, can we deduce about the properties
of this path? From the solution, it is evident that along an optimum path
(for u > 0) L^(t) is increasing and q is decreasing; thus, it follows from
(17) and (18) that the unemployment rate falls through time along this
22
path. Furthermore, it is readily seen that the value of output increases
along this path through time:
(28) Y= F^a^) +
(29) y= - P(l-u)F '^] - (PL^FJ) ;
But, u < 0; and, from (12) it can be seen that [F * - P(l-u)F *] > 0 since
c m
#
q < 0. Thus, regardless of the discount rate, the optimum path will be
characterized by increasing GNP.
Also, it can be seen that the marginal value product of the last
23employed worker will be larger in sector C. From (11) and (12):
(30) q = [r + 0- u$']q - [F ' - PF ' (N )] < 0
c mm
But [ $ - u$*] a 0 for all u since ^ 0; therefore, [r +$ - u$Mq > 0,
0
and q < 0 implies [F^* > Consequently, everywhere along the
optimal path the marginal value product of labor is larger in C.
This latter result implies that if factor price rigidities exist that
entail factor price equalization across sectors, the optimal policy will
entail subsidizing wages in M, Naturally, at any moment of time, the
optimal subsidy is less than that prescribed by the static conditions if
17
22However, it is also apparent that the initial unemployment rate is
an increasing function of T and a decreasing function of L (0).
c
23By assumption, if all workers are employed, F ' (L ) > PF ' (L ). However,
the unemployment in Mimplies that the marginal value product o? the last worker
hired exceeds PF '(L >.
m ^ m
24If there are no factor price rigidities and if labor moves only in
response to unemployment, then some non-market policy would be required to
encourage migration. However, if factor prices are flexible, it is reasonable
to assume labor migrates in response to wage differentials; this case has been
discussed earlier in the paper.
18
u > 0. How this dynamically optimum subsidy changes through time is a point
we shall return to shortly.
In order to deduce further properties of the optimum path, it is necessary
to make particular assumptions on the form of the functions, A very useful
25
assumption, and one that is reasonable for small u is: = 0, Since
any finite horizon path consists of a final portion for which u = 0, it
follows that this approximation is appropriate near the end of the period
of unemployment.
What happens to total employment in M on the optimal path? Clearly,
two opposing forces are at work—the total labor force is shrinking (in M),
but unemployment rates are falling. The net impact depends on the relative
sizes of these two effects. Without specific assumptions on$", or F^^",
it does not appear possible to describe how changes through time. However,
if = 0, the answer is apparent. From (11), for u > 0:
(11') 4^ '(u) . q = «I''(0) . q = PF '^(N^); q < 0
Since q decreases, if$ " = 0, then PF '(N ) must also decrease through time,
m m
Thus, for (j)" = 0, total employment in M rises along the optimum path (u > 0),
Furthermore, this same result holds during the final portion (of the
period of unemployment) for any finite horizon path. During this portion u
must be small, and since q does not tend to zero as u tends to zero (for
finite T), it follows that [$*(u) * q], and hence [PF '^(N^)], must be
falling. Therefore, towards the end of the period of unemployment, must
rise.
Finally, assuming factor prices must be equalized across sectors, let
us Inquire into the properties of the optimal subsidy. Two separate questions
arise: (1) how does the relation between the optimum dynamic subsidy and
^^For any u, $(u) « $(0) + $' (0) • u +$"(u) • u^, for some u* e [0, u].
Thus, if u Is small, we can approximate: ^ (u) =^'(0) • u, since ^(0) « 0.
19
the static subsidy change through time? and (ii) how does the optimum
dynamic subsidy change along the optimum path?
Consider the first problem; since L^(t) increases through time, the
static subsidy decreases. Also, since we start with u > 0, the dynamic
subsidy must initially be less than the static subsidy. However, since
u = 0 over the final portion of the path, the two are equal; thus, eventually
•k
the gap between them must be eliminated. If we define S (t) as the optimum
dynamic subsidy and S(t) as the corresponding static subsidy, we have:
(31) [(1 - S*)/(l - S)] = ^
Unless we know the properties of F it does not appear possible to say
how this ratio changes through time (though S (0) < S(0), and S (t) = S(t)
where u(t) =0). If we assume a constant output-labor elasticity for H:
(32) F (N ) = n"; a e (0, 1); then:
^ m m m
(31') [(1 - S*)/(l - S)] = (1 - u)"^"^
Since u < 0, the fraction [(1 - S*)/(l - S)] decreases through time, approach
ing one. Thus, the ratio of the percent of wages paid by employers in the
optimum dynamic case to the static case decreases through time. However,
even with (32) it is not possible to say (S - S ) monotonically decreases
through time; without (32) it does not seem possible to reach any specific
conclusions.
Next, consider how the optimal dynamic subsidy (S ) changes through
time. By definition:
(33) S* = 1 - ^ °
Clearly, increases through time, so that F '^ falls; what happens to F^*
• ^
depends on N , If N < 0, F ' increases and S falls through time. How-
m m ' m
ever, if > 0, as for $'* = 0 and latter portions of the optimal path, we
cannot determine a priori how S changes through time. In order to get
more specific results, we need some assumptions on F '•
o
Consider the locus in (L , q) space for which S, a subsidy rate, is
c
constant. Assuming = 0, we find from (11) and (33):
(34) [$*(0) • q/Fj,'] = (1 - S) for u > 0; thus:
(35) [(dq/dL^)a^/q)]g = [L^P^"/F '^] < 0
Equation (35) gives us the elasticity of an iso-subsidy line; note that it
is independent of q and S, and depends only on L^.
For the optimal path, we have from (11), (12) and (13):
(36) [dq/dL ] « [q/L ] = [ (r + 0'(0))q - F ']/U'(0) • u • LJ < 0
O C C
'ic
Letting S (t) represent the optimal subsidy at t, and using (11), we have,
for any point on the optimal path:
(37) [(dq/dL )(L/q)] = [L /uL ][(r(l - S*)-S* • «.'(0))/((l - S*)$'(0)))
^ ^ W ill
As u -♦ 0, the RHS in (37) tends to minus infinity; thus, subsidies must be
26
rising along the final portion of the optimum path. Note that this must hold
even if ^ 0, since, for small u, equation (37) can be used as a suitable
approxima t ion.
Suppose S (t) is not monotonic; then the optimum path must cross some
iso-subsidy line at least twice. If [L F "/F '] is constant (as for a
c c c
constant output-labor elasticity), the optimum path can cross a given iso-
subsidy line at most two times, since [L /uL 3 increases monotonically along
cm
the optimum path. Figure 4 depicts the relation between the iso-subsidy
lines and the optimum path for a given time horizon. Note that, given L ,
c
smaller values of q correspond to larger subsidies.
'if
If A" = 0 and [L F "/F '] is constant, then the time path of S (t) can
c c c
*
be characterized as follows: (1) for small T, S is constant and equal to
the static subsidy; (11) for intermediate values of T, S (t) rises for u > 0,
and then remains constant for u = 0; and (ill) for larger values of T, S (t)
decreases initially, reaches a minimum, and then increases until u = 0;
26
This assumes the planning horizon is finite.
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•k
again, the latter portion of the path is characterized by constant S .
Figure 5 depicts this result, assuming L (0) is the same in all cases.
Finally, note that, regardless of the assumptions on o" and 3»
S*(t) must increase during the final stages of unemployment for any finite
horizon path.
IV, CONCLUSION
We have seen that, if resources cannot be transferred costlessly, the
static subsidy is inefficient in a dynamic context unless the planning horizon
is short, or discount rates are large. Thus, in some sense the static
subsidy represents myopic behavior. Moreover, we have shown how the optimum
path can be determined and have characterized the properties of the path*
In particular, we have seen that for long time horizons and low discount
rates, it will always be optimal to have some unemployment initially; and
the Initial level of unemployment increases with the time horizon. Never
theless, if wages must be equalized across sectors, some subsidy will always
be needed; and we have discussed how this subsidy changes through time.
Thus, a realistic policy must recognize that resources are not Instantaneously
mobile, but it must also recognize that too large a subsidy removes the
Incentives for intertemporal reallocation of resources.
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